The aim of this paper is to provide one potential theoretical explanation for questions how asset bubbles come about, why it persists, and what caused it to burst. We propose a new model of bubbles and crashes. We divide the risky assets into two classes, the bubble asset and the non-bubble asset, and the risk-free asset. Investors are divided into two groups, the rational investors and the noise traders. The rational investors maximize their expected utility of their wealth in the next period. Noise traders maximize their random utility of binary choice: holding the bubble asset and holding the risk-free asst.
Introduction
In the last few decades, the asset markets have been frequently visited by bubbles and the subsequent crashes. The increasingly frequent market crashes have have not yet directly experienced the consequences of a stock market downturn. In accordance with traditional asst-pricing models (see e.g., Mossin (1966) and Lintner (1969)), the rational investors chooses that the portfolio of three assets, bubble asset, non-bubble asset and the risk-free asset which will maximize his expected utility of end-of-period wealth. On the other hand, noise traders maximize their random utility 3 of alternatives, that is, holding bubble stocks and holding the risk-free asset.
We assume that a noise trader's decision-making is influenced by (i) the decisions of the other noise-traders, and (ii) the return momentum on the bubble asset which is defined as the exponential moving average of the price changes. The noise-trader's utility function of an alternative is composed of those two attributes, and random variable. In our model, we show that as the interaction among noise traders is strengthened, the extent, that each noise-trader is influenced by the decisions of other noise-traders, is reinforced, and noise traders begin to follow the herd. In the attribute (ii), we also assume that the noise-traders' expectation of bubble stock prices is adaptive. The noise-traders adapt the positive feed-back strategy (momentum strategy) on the bubble asset. Our model indicates a mechanism that that noise-traders' herd behavior, which follows the behavior getting a majority, and their momentum trading, gives cause to a bubble ended up with a crash.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3, and in Section 4 we give a theoretical explanation on a mechanism of bubble and crash. We give concluding remarks in Section 5.
Model
Consider the risky assets, and the risk-free asset labeled f. We divided the risky assets into two classes: the bubble asset labeled 1 and the non-bubble asset labeled 2 which are portfolios of stocks in corresponding sectors. We also divide into two groups of investors with different decision making. The first group of investors is a group of rational investors who maximize their expected utility of wealth in the next period. The second group of investors is the group of the noise-traders who maximize the random utility of the binary choice: holding the bubble asset and holding the risk-free asset, and trades the bubble asst and the risk-free asset.
3
The qualitative choice models based on maximization of the agent's random utility has been developed by McFadden (1974) .
Rational investors
Let us consider the behavior of rational-investors. We shall assume that there is a number M of rational investors. Their object is to maximize the expected utility 
where an investor's wealth is written as 
where m denotes the Lagrangian. Demands for the bubble asset and non-bubble asset of the optimal portfolio are: From equations (3), the expected risk premium is calculated as 
The aggregated excess demands for the risky assets by rational investors are obtained by multiplying the number M of rational investors:
Noise traders
There 
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We assume that individual noise trader's decision-making is influenced by (i) the other noise-traders and (ii) the return momentum on the bubble asset. 
where the parameter l is assumed to be positive and constant. Given l is a positive, an increase in t s raises the utility of holding the bubble asset, and reduces the utility of holding the risk-free asset in the direction of the minority decision. This means that the noise trader has a tendency to be in favor of the majority decision.
t H denotes the return momentum of the bubble asset which is defined as the exponential moving average of the risk premium of the bubble asset,
where f r denotes the interest rate of the risk free asset. The return momentum t H of the bubble asset is equivalent to
where 0 1 q < < . It means that the noise-trader's expectation on the risk premium is adaptive. 
As the return momentum
The probability that a utility-maximizing noise trader will choose each alternative, is expressed as:
5
The fact that momentum strategies yield significant profits, have been well investigated. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examine a variety of momentum strategies and document that strategies earn profits.
Now we introduce a variable n which is the probability that a transition is attempted by one of the noise-traders, and follows a uniform distribution over noisetraders. We assume that one noise-trader attempts a trade in one time unit. The individual transition probabilities per an unit time period is described as 
The random variable n determines the time scale in which a transition which is attempted by a noise trader occurs. ii) A positive momentum t H increases the probability that a noise trader changes from holding the risk-free asset to holding the bubble asset, and reduces the probability of changing from holding the bubble asset to holding the risk-free asset, and vice versa for negative t H . 
Using the transition probabilities, the equation for the distribution ( )
where 
The equation (15) 
where ˆˆ( ) / Using the difference of ˆt s from period t to period t+1, the aggregate excess demand for the bubble asset by all noise traders is defined as ( )
where the parameter Q denotes the number of shares of the bubble asset which is exchanged in any transaction by a noise trader, and is assumed to be constant. The equation (18) will be utilized when the market prices of the risky assets are calculated under the market clearing conditions in section 2.4.
Collective behavior of the representative noise-traders
Before we discuss about bubbles and crashes, we describe the collective behavior of the representative noise-traders using equation ( ii) 
Solving the equations (19) with respect to the price changes on the risky assets
we can obtain the price changes of the risky assets which satisfy the market-clearing conditions. In summary, the dynamics of stock markets can be described as: 
